Conducting Negotiations:
An interview with Daniel Levin

Daniel has spent the last twenty-five years working with governments and development institutions worldwide, focusing on economic development and political reform through financial literacy, political inclusion, and constitutional initiatives. He is also engaged in track 3 diplomacy and mediation efforts in war zones. He is currently a member of the board of the Liechtenstein Foundation for State Governance and the author of several books including his most recent, Proof of Life. More information on his books is available at his website.

Q1. Please introduce yourself and explain in general terms the types of negotiations in which you are involved and the role you play. How are you brought into these situations and what are the criteria you use to decide whether or not you will get involved?

I am the executive director of the Liechtenstein Foundation for State Governance, which is engaged in failed states and conflict zones. The primary focus of our foundation is to identify qualified, young next-generation candidates and prepare them for future leadership roles. As our presence across the political spectrum and throughout several layers of society deepens in these countries and areas, we are increasingly asked to mediate between warring factions as well as between countries with a strategic stake in the particular region. Such mediations can range from cease-fire and de-escalation scenarios, hostage negotiations, to complex multi-party constellations involving conventional and nonconventional military threats. Our decision whether to get involved depends on the request by all pertinent parties to a conflict and the existence of a cascade/pathway towards successful outcomes.

Q2. Before a negotiation kicks off, how do you prepare? Much will be specific to the situation but are there any best practices in terms of research, due diligence or mental exercises that you feel are useful?

The external factors consist of (a) information/intelligence gathering and evaluation, and (b) the realistic assessment of existing relationship networks, including the dynamics of favors and counter-favors, often involving additional parties (similar to multiteam trades in sports). The internal factors are deeply personal, focused on muting (or slowing down) my instinctive reactions and emphasizing my cerebral decision-making (system one vs. system two).

Q3. What is your process for defining success and setting expectations?

The latter part of your question entails much of the response. The initial step of defining success lies in the proper framing of expectations. After that, it becomes a process of adjustments, with the primary challenge being the separation of correct/reliable information from incorrect/unreliable information. All along, one of the axiomatic conditions to success is not to let others define it for me, especially people and parties (a) without a stake in the game or (b) with a vested interest that will tilt the meaning of success towards one side only.

Q4. Every negotiation will have its own timeline and process, but can you share any observations on how negotiations tend to flow and what are key markers or milestones during this process? Is there a general script you follow, or do you leave significant room for improvisation and course corrections on the fly?

Structured, formal negotiations have a certain rhythm and flow, though the more formal they are, the more this flow resembles molasses. Informal negotiations, from nation-to-nation track 3 to hostage negotiations, have few chronological markers and milestones. The surest way to fail is to assume there is a general script to follow. Take, for example, hostage negotiations: all cases I have been involved in have entailed exceptions to the conventional sequencing (identify hostage taking group, obtain proof of life, identify price demand (without asking), collect and aggregate chips and favors as a basis for trade and barter, plan and execute logistics for release, exchange, and return). Sometimes, certain steps must be skipped or accelerated, sometimes re-sequenced, all depending on rapidly changing circumstances, which can include conditions such as a severe deterioration of the hostage’s health.

Q5. How do you assess the parties to a negotiation and how do you modify your tactics based on these assessments? Are your assessments mostly baked in before you sit down at the table, or these will be refined once you deal with someone face to face?

Face-to-face dynamics are both essential for certain positive chemistry and, at the same time, the source of dangerous error, mainly due to our innate tendency to overestimate our own acumen, charisma, and likeability. In many instances, I entertain face-to-face interactions less for the current, ongoing negotiations, and more for the next ones, when I will need to drink from the well of a preexisting relationship. This current meeting becomes the infusion line for the next surgery. As to firm assessments, the moment they become “firm” or set in stone, the negotiation has failed, irrespective of whether this fatal flaw is evident to my counterparty.

Q6. In every negotiation there is a balance of power and assets, how do you assess each party’s perception of the power balance?

First, I assume the other party has more power than I do. Second, I make sure the other party believes it is strong, but that its strength can either be augmented or destroyed by me. I have succeeded once I have convinced the other parties of the illusion that the choice is theirs. The same rules apply when mediating between multiple parties: each needs to be seduced into the illusion that it is in control, with just enough hubris to make mistakes, but not enough sense of power to cause the ambition of being able to dictate terms. Meanwhile, as a mediator, I need to self-efface myself out of the power contest. There is one unchallengeable commandment: the strings (pulled or not pulled) may never be visible.

Q7. When dealing with parties face to face, are there any non-verbal clues you rely upon (smells, for example)? Can these clues help inform or manage first impressions or instinctive judgments that might be incorrect?

Certainly, from body language (posture – e.g., concave vs. convex), voice pitch and tonality, temperature (shivers, sweats), and smells. Some of these indicators take us to the field of synesthesia (including colors), which merits a dedicated discussion of its own.

Q8. What are the qualities you admire in a negotiator and in a negotiating adversary? Do these allow for better outcomes or just make the process smoother and more predictable?

The best negotiators exhibit authentic curiosity and are able to balance confidence with humility – traits that can feel mutually exclusive, especially in high-pressure situations. The great equalizer, and the most promising way to bridge a gap, is humor (the kind that comes at one’s own expense, not at someone else’s – even the cruelest protagonist will not forgive, and be repelled by, cruelty by the “man in the middle”). As to negotiating adversaries, I admire the ability to grasp and internalize a position and an objective that is not their own. This may seem trite in its obviousness, but at a meaningful level it is an exceedingly rare quality, in particular among hostile state actors (surprisingly more likely among military leaders and hostage takers, whose transactional rationality (rather than the kindness of their heart) forces the best among them to develop this ability).

Q9. What timeless values do you bring to bear most often in negotiations? (integrity, courage, loyalty, compassion, civility, etc.)?

Those are misleading soft skills from conventional (as in “ordinary”) job profile checklists. These values are not measurable other than through a lengthy track record (in which case, they no longer need to be measured), and human beings tend to overestimate themselves comically when asked to assess their own virtues, the same way 85% of drivers believe they are above-average drivers. The traits I value are rationality and reason, even to the point of harshness. Those traits provide the necessary conditions for predictability, without which negotiations cannot succeed. All other virtues should be reserved for (and displayed in) the press conferences and afterparties.

Q10. How do you find ways to reduce rather than enhance tensions during a negotiation?

First, tensions can be a tactical tool, so there are situations that call for steady or even increased levels of controlled tension, usually for three purposes: (a) to keep the parties focused, (b) to prevent fraternizing between the parties that will lead to unforeseen collateral damage, and (c) to insinuate a threat of danger or chaos, should the negotiations fail. For the parties to believe that I would be willing to walk away (“I cannot want this more than you do”), I need to radiate that possible outcome credibly and convincingly. This cannot be accomplished without a certain tension. As for my internal tension, I distinguish between productive tension that focuses my mind and concentration, and destructive tension that reduces my performance (including memory loss). I try to maintain the former by sustaining an awareness of the stakes and my responsibilities, while reducing the latter through breathing, meditation, and another healing modality.

Q11. What are some mistakes you’ve made and what have you learned from them?

I have made so many mistakes, and the reasons for those mistakes are so numerous, that it is impossible to reduce them to one or just a few common denominators. But if I were to pick out just a couple based on the criteria of maximum effect (of the error as well as its correction), I would focus on hubris (overestimating my own abilities and effect on others) and excessive trust in another person’s spoken words (assurances, pledges of loyalty, expressions of friendship). My primary corrective measure has been to identify a counterparty’s vested interest(s) before taking any action and, most importantly, before placing any value on another person’s words. Until I cannot figure out cumulatively (a) what a counterparty is truly seeking, and (b) why I am being told that I am essential to this operation, I have to assume that I am being played.

Q12. How do you in a practical sense reduce noise and cognitive bias in your own decision-making process as well as the decision-making processes of the negotiating parties?

As a starting point, I recognize that it is impossible to eliminate noise (defined as useless variability) and bias in my decision-making process. Our foundation is actively developing adapted cognitive reflection tests for next-generation candidates in our initiatives (e.g., aspiring judges in Libya), so we are exposed to the factors that slow down or marginalize our own flawed instincts and allow for critical reassessments in the midst of an assignment. There are measures that can be taken to improve the “hygiene” of decision-making, including the mandatory inclusion of other, often critical or dissenting voices in the process (often on an anonymized basis, if necessary to avoid fear of confrontation or a poisoning of relationships).

Q13. How do you identify the patterns of logic in the counterparty’s reasoning to anticipate their next move?

A counterparty’s degree of logic and quality of reasoning is directly proportional to the ability to take adverse interests and positions into account, which in turn is measured by the ability to internalize the relativity (to the point of randomness) of our objectives, rather than framing them as right vs. wrong or, even more dangerously, as good vs. evil. In negotiations, morality is irrelevant. And effective negotiators will understand that this is not an amoral statement. I also try to remind myself that any notion of predictive or prognosticative abilities is a delusion.

Q14. In cases where there have been successful outcomes, are there any lessons you’ve learned or patterns you’ve observed?

The most dangerous mistakes follow lessons learned from success. Most of my own growth has come from my failures. Correlated to that, I have formed my most trusted relationships with those counterparties who have not taken advantage of my failures.

Q15. Given the human propensity to risk more to avoid loss than to achieve gain, how do you influence the counterparty’s perception of available alternatives with respect to wins and losses?

Risk-loss balance does (should) not exist in a vacuum. First, any intelligence-based analysis will also take relative upside (ceiling) and relative downside (floor) into account. Only rarely are those even close to symmetrical (let alone equal), which requires the calculation of the proper risk coefficient to establish a meaningful comparison. And second, any empathy-based analysis will take into account who is paying the price for failure (loss), and whether that party can afford to pay that price. Consider as illustration scenarios such as de-escalation of non-conventional threats or hostage negotiations to get a sense of the spectrum’s complexity.

Q16. Do you have any books or other recommended reading, or advice for readers who want to improve their negotiating skills?

I’m not a big fan of self-help or how-to books (possibly because I haven’t yet read any good ones). I consider negotiation skills best acquired through exposure, ideally in an environment that provides the right mix of mentoring and trial by fire.

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