Brazil, Foreign Relations and the Growing Importance of the China Relationship: An interview with Giorgio Romano Schutte

You may listen to this interview from HERE. 

Giorgio Romano Schutte is an Associate Professor at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC) in Brazil. He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of São Paulo (2003) and conducted postdoctoral research at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU) and at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taipei in 2020. His research is in the field of International Relations, with an emphasis on International Political Economy, focusing primarily on the geopolitics of energy, China’s international rise, and Brazil’s foreign policy and international insertion.

He was an advisor in the labor union movement in both Europe and Brazil and also served as Deputy Secretary at the Municipal Secretariat for International Relations of São Paulo. He was a staff member at the World Bank, where he worked as Regional Coordinator of The Cities Alliance. Giorgio is a member of the Brazilian Network for China Studies (RBChina) and the Observatory of Brazil’s Foreign Policy and International Insertion (OPEB). He is the author of the book Oasis for Capital – Fertile Ground for the “Gold Rush”: The Dynamics of Chinese Productive Investments in Brazil, as well as several academic and opinion articles on the Brazil-China relationship. More information on his publications can be found at this link.

Q1. Please introduce yourself and tell us about your current interests.

I was born and raised in the Netherlands, to an Italian mother. I spent most of my summers in Italy and conducted my master’s research on the political economy of industrial restructuring in the country. Through my work with trade unions, I ended up moving to São Paulo, Brazil, in 1991. I married Rose there, and we have two children, Isadora and Angelo. I obtained Brazilian citizenship in 2001.

I continued working with trade unions in various capacities, conducting research on multinational corporate investments, developing educational programs on the impacts of globalization for workers, managing international relations for the national trade union center, and serving as a political advisor to the chemical workers’ union.

In 2001, I assisted in creating the International Relations Department of the City of São Paulo and became its Deputy Secretary. In 2004, I was invited to serve as International Advisor to the Secretary-General of the Presidential Office in Brasília. After that I held the position of Regional Advisor for Latin America at Cities Alliance, which was administered at the time by the World Bank. Between 2009 and 2010, I helped establish the Unit for International Economic and Political Affairs at the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) in Brasília. After that, I joined the Federal University of ABC (UFABC), an innovative, state-of-the-art, public university. I was responsible for creating the International Relations undergraduate program, which I coordinated for five years (2012-2016). Since 2025, I have been coordinating the Master’s program. Throughout all these years, I have been actively engaged in public debates and discussions on Brazil’s foreign policy, the political economy of energy, and the global impact of China’s rise, particularly in Brazil.

Q2. In your view, what are the primary challenges and opportunities facing Brazil and what role do you see international trade and foreign relations playing in the development of the economy and society?

The main challenge is to create a national coalition that is both willing and capable of supporting a new industrialization linked to the green and digital revolutions. The opportunities are considerable, given the size of the domestic market and Brazil’s natural leadership role in South America. In addition, other important factors include its outreach to Africa, its role as a political actor in the Global South in general and its capacity to maintain strong dialogue with G7 countries. Its abundance of natural resources, and the continued presence of a demographic bonus are also worth noting.

International trade can contribute by connecting Brazil to global value chains, but even more important is attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and ensuring it is aligned with efforts to expand endogenous industrial and technological capacity. Active foreign relations are crucial to improving Brazil’s position in the global system. International cooperation on multiple fronts, academic, cultural, and economic, is essential to strengthen and project Brazil’s potential. However, this will only have a positive impact if it is underpinned by a clear national strategy capable of withstanding short-term political and financial pressures.

Q3. President Lula’s foreign policy of “politica ativa e altiva” from his first two terms in office was seen as a significant change in Brazil’s engagement with the world. Please explain what this policy meant and its significance.

The so-called proactive and assertive foreign policy refers to the approach articulated during Lula’s first two terms in office (2003–2006 and 2007–2010). It marked a clear departure from the foreign policies of his predecessor, which were strongly aligned with liberal, pro-OECD agendas. These policies positioned Brazil as part of “the West” rather than of “the Rest”, as Alice Amsden called what is by now known as the Global South.

Lula opposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), full OECD membership, and the concession of the Alcântara satellite launch base in northern Brazil to U.S. interests. Instead, he launched a series of alternative and multipolar diplomatic initiatives. In 2003, he helped establish the IBSA Dialogue Forum with India and South Africa and formed the G20 group within the WTO during the Cancún conference. Together with France and Chile, and later joined by Germany and Spain, with the support of the UN Secretary-General, he launched the Global Initiative to Fight Hunger and Poverty as a response and alternative to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. All of these efforts, among other initiatives, took place in just the first year of Lula’s presidency. Over the following seven years, additional initiatives emerged, such as increased engagement with Africa, the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), expanded relations with China, and the creation of the BRICS group in 2008. In 2010, he supported Brazil’s involvement in nuclear negotiations with Iran, a process that was initially successful but immediately undermined by the United States.

The strength of this proactive and assertive foreign policy was deeply connected to Lula’s personal history as a metalworker who rose through the labor movement to become the first blue-collar worker to serve as President of the Republic. It also benefited from Lula’s ability to expand on Brazil’s image as a country that makes friends, not enemies, and was supported by a favorable internal context of economic and political progress. At the time, Brazil became a US dollar creditor, earned investment-grade status, and was able to respond effectively to the 2008 global financial crisis.

Q4. After returning to power in 2023, how have Lula’s policies changed or evolved? How do you assess his performance to date, and do you feel he has been able to adapt to the significant domestic and international changes that have occurred since his previous terms in office?

By 2023, Lula returned to a very different Brazil and a profoundly changed international environment, marked by the war in Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, a far more powerful China, and the election of Donald Trump. Domestically, Lula now faces a conservative and anti-popular majority in Congress, which has gained power and, in practice, weakened Brazil’s presidential system. The country is more polarized than before, as is South America and the world at large.

Nonetheless, the first three years of Lula’s third term coincide with a series of symbolic and strategic opportunities: the 50th anniversary of Brazil–China relations, Brazil’s presidency of the G20 and BRICS, and the hosting of COP30. These events offer Brazil a rare chance to project itself globally and draw the world’s attention inward.

Lula was determined to seize this opportunity despite all the constraints. He has continued to pursue a common regional agenda and to position Brazil as a key leader of the Global South, alongside its BRICS partners, but in close dialogue with the OECD core countries, especially in Europe, Japan, and Biden’s United States. So far, relations with Trump have been kept at a distance, with a “wait and see” approach.

Q5. What is the history of Brazil’s relationship with China and what were the catalysts that led to the remarkable growth in trade and investment ties?

The political relationship with the People’s Republic of China began in the early 1960s with Brazil’s independent foreign policy and the historic visit of Vice President João Goulart to China. Solidarity among what is now referred to as the Global South was emphasized, although Brazil only officially recognized the PRC in 1974. Brazil participated in the Bandung Conference only as an observer and was not formally a member of the G77.

Chinese interest in Brazil increased under Deng Xiaoping, particularly in learning from Brazil’s achievements such as the Itaipu hydroelectric project, which served as a reference for the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. During the 1980s, many delegations comprising hundreds of specialists from various fields visited Brazil. Even the start of cooperation in satellite development was, for the Chinese, a way to catch up technologically. At the time, Brazil was also interested in importing food products and oil from China. Since then, things have changed dramatically. China’s transformation into an industrial powerhouse in the early 2000s coincided with Brazil’s efforts to diversify its markets. Trade relations were soon followed by Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil, and in parallel, political relations deepened. This was driven by a shared understanding of the need to reform global governance structures, particularly the WTO, IMF, and World Bank. This shared agenda has been pursued notably through cooperation within the BRICS framework.

Q6. While there is a lot of media attention on Brazil’s relationship with China, the country also has long-standing ties with the United States and Europe. In the current geopolitical climate, how does Brazil balance its relationships between these three actors, and does this give the country more flexibility and room to maneuver?

I don’t think the idea of “balancing” is appropriate, although it is often mentioned. First of all, Brazil has strong historical ties not only with the United States but also with Europe. In fact, if we look at the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), the European Union as a whole is by far the number one investor. Trade relations have also traditionally been divided between the U.S. and Europe, which gave Brazil more room to maneuver, even though it is still considered part of what Washington likes to call its “backyard.”

Now, a third major player has entered the scene: China. However, we should not forget Brazil’s historical ties with Japan either, as Brazil is home to the largest Japanese community outside of Japan. That said, China has rapidly become the dominant partner in a relatively short time. Since 2009, it has been Brazil’s top export destination, and since 2012, its main overall trading partner, with Brazil consistently running a large trade surplus. In 2023, China represented less than 30% of Brazil’s trade flows but contributed to more than 50% of its total trade surplus. In that year Brazil’s trade surplus with China reached USD 51.1 billion. This indicates significant economic and financial interests are at stake in the relationship.

This also helps explain why, during Trump’s first administration, even with his close ally Bolsonaro in office in Brazil, the U.S. failed to persuade Brazil to exclude Huawei from its 5G rollout. Of course, the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations did not share Lula’s view on the geopolitical importance of the relationship with China or the BRICS more broadly.

Lula, however, has made it clear that he aims to upgrade the relationship with China, particularly by seeking synergies with Brazil’s own industrial and technological programs. This intention was reflected in his decision not to simply sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Instead, Lula proposed signing agreements that would actually implement this synergy—an approach accepted by China following two visits by Lula to Beijing (in 2023 and 2025) and two visits by Xi Jinping to Brazil (in 2024 and 2025).

This upgrade is expected to be reflected specifically in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), which should increasingly contribute to enhancing Brazil’s industrial and technological capabilities. In November 2024, the Synergy Agreement was signed, built around two pillars. The first focuses on infrastructure, and industrial and technological upgrading, identifying four major development programs in coordination with the BRI. In Brazil, coordination was centralized in the Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (Casa Civil), with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as its Chinese counterpart.

The second pillar concerns financial cooperation, coordinated by the Ministries of Finance and the Central Banks of both countries. Negotiations began immediately to identify concrete projects involving Brazilian and Chinese companies or research institutes. During Lula’s visit to China in early May 2025, the first list of around 30 concrete projects was signed. Examples include initiatives in high-quality medical imaging equipment and chip production for electrification.

At the same time, the presidents decided to elevate the bilateral relationship from a “Global Strategic Partnership” to a “Brazil-China Community of Shared Future for a Fairer World and a More Sustainable Planet”—whatever that may mean.

Q7. Beyond selling raw materials and agricultural products, what is Brazil hoping to gain from China? Do you feel the current open door policies could lead to deindustrialization, and if so, how might this be avoided? Using EVs as an example, what are the risks and opportunities from engaging more closely with China?

The so-called premature deindustrialization of Brazil began well before China emerged as a major player in the Brazilian economy. It was largely driven by the external debt crisis of the 1980s and the neoliberal policies of the 1990s. However, there is no doubt that Brazil’s relationship with China has followed and reinforced this trend. Due to the sheer volume of trade, it has intensified Brazil’s specialization in agricultural and mineral exports. Soybeans, iron ore, and oil account for the bulk of Brazil’s exports to China and are the main reason behind the substantial trade surplus, one that has enabled Brazil to maintain impressive foreign exchange reserves of around USD 350 billion.

So far, Chinese FDI stock remains far behind that of Europe and the United States, and the same is true for investment flows. The issue is that Chinese FDI is highly concentrated in a few specific sectors. In Brazil’s case, around 70% is directed toward energy, oil and, above all, electricity where companies like State Grid and China Three Gorges (CTG) have made Brazil their largest FDI destination. However, even within these sectors, Chinese participation remains relatively limited, around 10% in oil and 15% in electricity. The current debate is now focused on FDI in electric vehicles (EVs) and the local content requirements associated with it.

The visits to Japan and Europe in these years, as well as the 2023 visit to Washington, were not attempts at “balancing,” but rather efforts to identify and make good use of all the available opportunities for cooperation and economic relations, whether in trade, investment, or other areas.

Q8. How would you assess the level of mutual understanding and interest between China and Brazil? Is there growing interest in Brazil and China by young people to learn Chinese and Portuguese and build careers across these two countries?

Countries are quickly going through a learning curve. Brazilian academia, research centers, and government institutions have been accumulating a growing understanding of Chinese politics, economics, history, and culture. Brazil currently has 13 Confucius Institutes, and many more universities are eager to establish one. Students show strong interest in learning more about China, not only its politics and economy, but also its culture, despite the vast geographical distance, which limits people-to-people exchanges.

Government officials and businesspeople are taking advantage not only of increasingly intense bilateral relations, but also of frequent meetings within frameworks like BRICS and the G20. Brazil’s diplomatic presence in China has also become more robust, with more diplomats fluent in Mandarin. Several Brazilian journalists are also based in China.

Of course, China is more important to Brazil than Brazil is to China, but Brazil, and Lula in particular, does attract interest in China. Still, to keep perspective: due to geographic, cultural, and linguistic factors, general knowledge about Europe and the U.S. continues to far surpass that of China. Brazilian businesses are still quite lost in the Chinese environment, with a few exceptions. But it’s important to consider that Brazil’s FDI has traditionally been concentrated in South America anyway, with exceptions such as Petrobras, Vale, steel companies, and the financial sector.

Q9. What are your thoughts on BRICS as a grouping, and do you see it playing a more important role in the future? What does Brazil hope to achieve from its participation?

Brazil played a major role, alongside Russia, in establishing the BRICS in 2008. It’s worth recalling that Lula’s 2002 government program explicitly stated that he would prioritize relations with China, India, Russia, and South Africa! Lula and his team, then and now, have a clear understanding that the world is shifting toward a post-Western orientation, and that it is time for “the Rest” to become active players in shaping the evolving international order.

So, when Lula jokes that we are no longer “the Third World,” but rather the “Global South,” he is expressing a profound historical insight and Brazil has given the 2025 Summit the title: “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.”

BRICS has played a significant role in deepening Brazil’s international projection, beginning with joint interventions in the G20 and the establishment of the New Development Bank. It has also encouraged the government and several sectors of Brazilian society, not least the academic community, to engage more seriously with member countries. Within the BRICS framework, more than a hundred meetings are held annually across various sectors, providing significant exposure to non-Western experiences, policies, and perspectives.

Liberal, Western-oriented Brazilian analysts, diplomats, and academics have historically failed and often still struggle to grasp the historical significance of BRICS as the most organized expression of what we now call the “Global South.” They often echo Western skepticism and concerns. But if BRICS were truly just a vague concept without substance, why would so many countries be lining up to join (well before Trump began damaging the image of his own country on the world stage)? BRICS should be understood as an evolving process, not judged solely by its tangible outputs though even then, the creation of a development bank without any core OECD member at the table is no small feat.

Q10. A concern raised by environmentalists relates to Brazil’s massive trade in agricultural products, as it has led to extensive deforestation, ecosystem degradation and even shortages in the domestic market. What are your views on this and how should the government and private sector address these issues?

These concerns are not just those of environmentalists, they reflect real issues that Brazil must confront. The link between agriculture and illegal deforestation depends heavily on government policies. Controlled land management and zero tolerance for illegal deforestation are achievable without harming key interests in agricultural production or exports, as demonstrated by several governments since the mid-2000s. Failures in this effort were clearly the result of political decisions. Increasing productivity, using technology to restore degraded land, and coordinating efforts to combat illegal mining and land exploitation are in the interest of any modernization project.

Q11. Looking closer to home, how do you view Brazil’s relationships with countries in South America and what do you see as the primary challenges and risks in this region?

Unfortunately, Brazil’s relationship with other South American countries is largely shaped by political cycles. Intra-regional trade and investment remain limited, a fact that becomes especially evident when compared to regions like Europe or Southeast Asia, for example. As a result, there is no strong economic framework in place to ensure continuity during political transitions, which are quite common in the region.

From a trade perspective, the strong economic presence of Chinese capital across South America has also tended to have a disintegrating effect. Brazil has lost its natural markets for manufactured goods in the region to Chinese competitors. This impact can be partially offset by China’s contribution to infrastructure investments that promote physical integration. Nonetheless, with the exception of the 2016–2022 period, Brazil has prioritized strengthening South American integration since the early 2000s, guided by a clear understanding that in a multipolar world, Brazil can only claim its global role through a strong South American pole.

Q12. Please share any favorite books, publications, blogs, podcasts or other resources that readers could use to improve their understanding of Brazil, its relationship with China, foreign policy, economic/trade issues, or any other related topics.

• Weekly newsletter on Brazil-China relations in its various dimensions (cultural, political, economic, etc): Shūmiàn (书面)
• For economic, commercial and business relations: CEBC – Conselho Empresarial Brasil China – Especially the annual overviews on Chinese investments in Brasil
• For an analytical view on the dynamics of Chinese FDI in Brazil: Oásis para o capital – solo fértil para a “corrida de ouro”: a dinâmica dos investimentos produtivos chineses no Brasil.
• For a general view on Brazilian foreign policy development, including relations with China: OPEB.

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