Question: What will be the key issues defining China/Russia relations in 2021?
Kalavinka View
Both regimes have overcome the extensive differences which surfaced in the last century and adopted a more pragmatic and realistic relationship based on a clear appraisal of their national interests, commitment to multilateralism, and shared ideological antagonists. Whilst we may expect to see further strengthening of cooperation in finance, trade, technology, and military interoperability, they are unlikely to contrive any joint initiative to frame a new world order, not least because neither country has succeeded in projecting a positive image overseas except in countries constrained by economic or political dependence. Moreover, their approach to the international community is markedly different. China is now the confident and assertive revanchist power seeking access and influence within the international organisations hitherto dominated by the US and its allies. Russia by contrast is a disruptive opportunist taking advantage of the West’s weakness to establish spheres of influence in strategic regions like the Middle East and Central Asia and supports the suppression of dissent in its erstwhile satellites.
Moscow has tried to exploit the entente with Beijing to unsettle the West with the prospect of a Sino-Russian bloc taking shape. However, the relationship remains a marriage of convenience, which will survive as long as it serves their respective interests and is not challenged by a grand alliance of democratic nations acting in concert. So, what are the potential circuit breakers in the relationship? Firstly, a clash in overlapping spheres of interest in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, where Russia currently provides security and China economic assistance. Secondly, a loss of control by Putin and his oligarch allies due to a popular insurrection, which might lead to a government much less favourably inclined towards China. Thirdly, as a result of diverging values related to climate and carbon goals, which might see China negatively impacted by Russia’s lack of interest or progress on these issues. Lastly, a decoupling might result from an outbreak of hostilities between the US and China: in these circumstances would Russia offer genuine support to China, for example by conflict support, rather than simply soundbites at the Security Council? This would be a highly controversial move for a country whose elite still consider Russia a European or Western-centric power.
Zachary Paikin
Russia-China relations in 2021 will be driven by a continued rapprochement. Both the US and Russia under their current leadership believe that destabilizing each other’s political systems is a legitimate foreign policy aim. This ensures that relations between Moscow and Washington will remain largely adversarial if not outright confrontational. Moreover, attempts at a minor reset in US-China relations will not alter the dynamic of Sino-American competition on a variety of security, economic and technological issues. The Biden administration’s decision to preserve the Trump-era “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept marks an important element of continuity in US foreign policy toward Asia. No definitive resolution or even agreed-upon framework for interaction appears on the horizon in the Russia-West or US-China rivalries. As such, any potential irritants in Sino-Russian bilateral ties will be secondary considerations when compared with Moscow and Beijing’s respective antagonistic relations with Washington. This suggests that the status quo between Russia and China — a strategic entente — will continue to suit both parties for the foreseeable future.
Moscow may profess that it is not merely another participant in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and will insist on a bilateral integration of equals. A formal alliance is unlikely for now given both sides’ desire to retain a degree of maneuverability. But Russia has long priced in the reality of China’s rising economic and security presence in its historic Central Asian sphere of influence. Moreover, the value of maintaining good relations with Moscow will continue to grow for Beijing as the latter’s relations with Washington and with some (but not all) regional players sours. Western criticism along values-based lines, which shows no sign of abating, will be interpreted by Russia and China as an instrumental political weapon rather than as a genuine attempt to construct a liberal international order. This only serves to drive Moscow and Beijing closer together. Seeing as China remains an anchor of the global economy and a full-fledged coalition aimed at containing Beijing’s rise — already a dubious proposition — is unlikely to emerge, the above trends suggest that a uniform and disembodied international order will not consolidate at the global level. Liberalized trade and rules-based interaction will persist in various forms, but the next phase of economic, political and normative globalization will be largely state-driven rather than supranational.
Zachary is a Researcher in EU Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and a Nonresident Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Toronto. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Kent.
Dirk Van Der Kley
2020-21 will be one of gradual incrementalism in the China-Russia relationship, not drastic change. One underlying issue continues to dominate and drive the China-Russia relationship: Beijing’s desire to reduce its vulnerabilities to the US. Moscow seeks to take economic advantage of this while also balancing its relations with the EU and US, but Beijing is in the lead. This alignment of interest will continue to overcome mutual distrust between both countries. These vulnerabilities can be split into two groups. The first are agricultural and hydrocarbon imports in which Russia has natural advantages. I expect to see steady increases in volumes (value will be price dependent) in both for many years as Beijing seeks to diversify these imports as much as possible. We will probably see announcements on cooperation in large hydrocarbon projects over the next few years.
The second group of vulnerabilities are global systemic challenges in which the US can cripple China (at great cost to the US): 1) US control over global financial flows; 2) US tech capacity and its ability to limit PRC access to critical foundational technology; and 3) US military power. Beijing wants to enlist Russia’s help to manage or circumvent US power on these issues. It will seek to collaborate on digital currency as an alternative to the SWIFT system, and it will continue to sell tech to Russia, train Russian tech workers and try to jointly develop technology. In the next few years, China and Russia will need to deliver on this vision rather than just talk about it as they have for quite some time. My prediction is we will see genuine cooperation on digital currency. Both countries are fearful of US financial sanctions. Circumventing US financial power is no easy task, but this will be priority number one for the relationship. Military cooperation will continue to focus on hardware sales to China, but nothing approaching a military alliance. Joint military tech collaboration has developed little new technology. More broadly, Russia does not have the capacity to really help Beijing in the tech battle.
Dirk is a Research Fellow at the Australian National University and Board Member for the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the Australian National University
External Contributor
China’s rapid economic recovery from the pandemic might deliver substantial changes to Central Asia’s geopolitical and economic landscape. Previously, Beijing and Moscow had a consensus that outlined demarcation lines between the two powers. Russia was responsible for the security and political ventures with its former Soviet satellites, while Beijing contributed to its economic development. The calculus, however, might change in the post-pandemic setting. Russia’s economic stagnation and domestic political hurdles will continue to erode its foreign policy leverage. Rapidly growing Uzbekistan and gradually reforming Kazakhstan will ultimately proceed with the diversification of economic and political ties. Both nations will likely enter into fierce competition with each other to assert and maintain regional leadership. This might result in both Astana and Tashkent striving to expand their relations within the region and outside of it, specifically with Beijing, Western nations and Turkey.
Russia will have to increase its outreach across the region to maintain its assertive posture. But the region’s internal dynamic combined with China’s robust economic growth and competition with other external powers will continue to downsize Russia’s historical hegemony. The situation could lead to a dilemma for Moscow. The Kremlin will ultimately have to increase its investments into Central Asia to maintain its geopolitical posture and challenge other competing powers’ inroads. But because of the metastasizing domestic hurdles, Moscow will likely struggle with resources and their external allocation. Unless Russian political leadership embraces a more aggressive and interventionist approach in foreign policy, which might have domestic repercussions, its current presence in the region is destined for a gradual decline. It is unlikely that the region will emerge as an arena of Beijing and Moscow’s geopolitical rivalry. Instead, both powers would again agree to its status quo, but with less Russian presence and greater tolerance for its political and economic diversification. In the long-run, this might deliver positive changes to Central Asia. During the past two decades, Moscow served as a significant external supporter of local authoritarianism and repression, which hampered its development. Although the decline of Russia’s political presence probably won’t trigger fully-fledged democratization, it will facilitate positive economic and political changes that might improve the local business climate and contribute to the region’s resilience.
The contributor is a Russian independent analyst who covers issues related to Russia, China, and Central Asia.