India, China and the Expanding BRICS Community: An interview with Manoj Kewalramani

You may listen to this interview from HERE.

Manoj Kewalramani is Fellow-China Studies and the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution. He is also a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Manoj is the author of Smokeless War: China’s Quest for Geopolitical Dominance, which discusses China’s political, diplomatic, economic and narrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Manoj also publishes a daily newsletter translating and analyzing discourse from the People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper. Prior to joining Takshashila, he spent over a decade working as a journalist in India and China, where he helped set up digital newsrooms and train young journalists. More information on Manoj’s work can be found at his website.

Q1. Please introduce yourself and tell us about your current interests.

In an ideal world, I would have begun this response by saying that I am a Bollywood celebrity. Alas, neither did I have the aptitude nor the patience for success in the movies, and soon realized that I wasn’t getting anywhere struggling in Mumbai. Instead, I opted for journalism and then eventually moved into research and analysis on geopolitics and strategic affairs. Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy form the core of my research interests.

Q2. How would you characterize the current state of the India/China relationship? When did relations start to deteriorate and where do you see things today? Do you have much optimism in the recent statements around resolving the border dispute? As far as India is concerned, what do they need from China to resolve this dispute and what do you think the Chinese side wants?

I think it is safe to say that the bilateral relationship between India and China is at its worst since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Although India was among the first countries to recognise the PRC in April 1950, the relationship went through a decade of ups and downs before snapping, following a brief conflict in 1962. It took 17 years thereafter for formal diplomatic ties to be restored.

Today, the relationship is in a new era of volatility, and my view is that this is likely to sustain for the foreseeable future. There are structural factors driving this trend, such as the expanded interests and capacities of the two countries, the asymmetry of power between the two, and, of course, the shifts in the world order characterized by US-China competition.

The proximate cause for the current tensions can perhaps be tracked back to 2017, when the two countries were embroiled in a 74-day standoff along the Doklam plateau. However, it is important to highlight that political trust between the two has always been very low and fragile, while mutual suspicion has always been fairly high. Despite the resolution of the immediate situation in Doklam and subsequent informal summits between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in 2018 and 2019, tensions persisted. The 2020 standoff in Eastern Ladakh, with the PLA crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to occupy key positions and the subsequent violence in the Galwan Valley, which led to the first loss of life along the disputed boundary in over four decades, have severely damaged the relationship. Both sides today have around 60,000 troops that are forward deployed, with the boundary becoming a live issue.

I am not optimistic about the resolution of the boundary dispute. This will require a fundamental change in Chinese policy, which begins by first sharing what exactly is China’s perception of the LAC and how far do its territorial claims extend. Beijing has categorically refused to do so thus far. Rather, it has used the boundary dispute as an instrument to stymie India’s rise and coerce Delhi — particularly in the context of its deepening ties with the US — while building up its infrastructure and capabilities.

A resolution to the boundary dispute with China is in India’s interest. What, I believe, Delhi would like is for Beijing to walk the talk on peace, restore the pre-April 2020 status quo in Eastern Ladakh, adhere to agreed-upon protocols and CBMs, cease its support for Pakistan-based terrorists, and engage in purposeful diplomacy starting with sharing maps of its perceptions and claims.

Q3. Government to government relations are one aspect but how has the sentiment of the average Indian towards China changed in recent years? The pandemic was certainly not a good time for building relationships, but have you seen any resurgence in personal ties whether through education, tourism, business/trade or academic channels? The mutual expulsion of journalists certainly didn’t help but do you see that situation changing?

Historically, Indians have not had a terribly positive view of China. But I would say that this perception is not necessarily a reflection of the Indian public’s view of the Chinese people. It is rather a perception with regard to the actions of the Chinese state and the Communist Party of China.

This is part of the legacy of the 1962 war, which China won. Both countries dealt with the memory of that conflict very differently. In China, until very recently, it barely figured in public or popular discourse. In India, it left a deep scar on the nation’s psyche. This was reflected in popular books, movies and songs. Indians felt deeply betrayed by a fellow Asian power, whose international socialization Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had supported. The war, in many ways, also deeply challenged the sense of idealism and Asian romanticism that was once a feature of Indian foreign policy.

However, the normalization of ties in the late 1970s started the process of repairing the relationship. By the first decade of the 2000s, one could argue that popular perception in India was truly beginning to turn a corner. Part of this was because of the economic optimism around India and China being emerging economies and part of it was a product of the demonstration effect of China’s phenomenal growth. For many Indians, China’s remarkable growth story was a matter of inspiration. This was evident in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in 2004, referencing Shanghai’s development when talking about Mumbai’s future. This was also a period in which trade, tourism, and educational and cultural exchanges grew.

However, I think the last six years of friction and political discord have dealt a severe blow to people-to-people relations. At its height towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, China’s favorability rating among Indians was around 40%; the latest Pew survey puts this at 26%. At the same time, it says that negative opinions about China in India rose from 46% in 2019 to 67% in 2023. If one looks at Indian media coverage of China, it is overwhelmingly from the threat prism rather than an opportunity prism.

It is extremely difficult to reverse this trend. In a manner of speaking, Beijing’s actions have meant that it has lost the trust of at least a generation of Indians, particularly given the rising tide of nationalism in India. The expulsion of journalists, like you’ve pointed out, is an outcome of this erosion of trust. And this situation is likely to persist. For instance, look at the friction between the two sides around the Asian Games currently underway in Hangzhou. Chinese authorities denied visas to Indian athletes from the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which resulted in the Indian sports minister canceling his visit to China.

Despite all this, the trade relationship between the two sides remains robust and is likely to continue to remain strong. This also tells us a little bit about how both sides increasingly have a need-based or instrumental approach to the relationship rather than it developing organically.

Q4. How would you describe the economic/trade relationship between China and India, and do you see this as an area that might supplant geopolitical concerns in the future?

As I said earlier, I think the trade relationship is fairly robust and is likely to remain that way. As a colleague of mine, Pranay Kotasthane, very eloquently argued recently that the road for India to overtake China in many sectors will flow through China. Just look at India’s electronics imports. China is a massive player and is likely to continue to remain a critical partner. The Indian government’s own statements acknowledge this. For instance, responding to a question in Parliament earlier this year, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry said:

“India’s imports from China are mainly of telecom instruments, computer hardware, fertilisers, electronic components, project goods, drug intermediates, consumer electronics, etc. Some of these imports are necessary for meeting the demand of our fast expanding sectors like telecom, electronics and power in India and imports like Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) and drug formulations provide the Indian pharma industry raw material for producing finished goods which are also exported out of India.”

Despite that, I don’t see the economic relationship supplanting geopolitical concerns. In fact, I believe that the economic relationship is likely to be increasingly strained owing to political and geopolitical factors.

In the past few years, despite border tensions or the pandemic India’s trade with China continued to remain strong. This is partly because of the structural imbalance in terms of the commodities that are traded. India largely imports capital goods, intermediate goods and raw materials used for meeting the demand in sectors like electronics, telecom and power, as mentioned above. But India’s exports to China are primarily iron ore, cotton, copper, seafood, spices, aluminum and diamonds, and natural gems. In addition, China’s market access barriers against Indian agricultural products and sectors like pharmaceuticals, IT, and the services trade have amplified the uneven nature of the trade relationship.

Of course, this lopsided nature of trade along with deepening political mistrust has led to furious discourse within the Indian policy-making and business circles in recent years. While complete decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable, there is an element of de-risking taking place. This is evident in changes in tariffs with regard to certain imports, banning of certain Chinese apps like TikTok, restrictions on Chinese telecom giants from participating in India’s 5G deployment, the launch of India’s Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, India’s economic engagement with like-minded partners such as the Quad, and so on.

Q5. With the recent BRICS summit in South Africa, the media and pundits are full of hyperbole about the potential of this grouping as an alternative to the G7. What is your take and how should India approach this expansion? Is there a concern that BRICS is primarily a Chinese forum that will ultimately follow its guidance? How do you see BRICS evolving into a more formal structure with rules and obligations/responsibilities, and should the US and its allies be concerned about this?

Yes, I concur that there is more significant hyperbole around BRICS than actual achievement. Historically, economic cooperation and somewhat shared perspectives among emerging economies on matters related to global governance reform provided the raison d’etre for BRICS cooperation. In this sense, the group’s agenda was not just economic but also political. Over time, officially, BRICS cooperation has expanded to be premised on the three pillars: political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. In practice, it has been the economy and finance pillar, however, that has done the heavy lifting. This is evident in the establishment of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. In contrast, the political and security pillar has largely under-delivered. Of course, there have been annual meetings of BRICS foreign ministers and security advisors since 2009. But those have generally been about reaffirming shared perspectives on global governance issues and coordinating positions on shared concerns as opposed to necessarily operationalizing new, broad-based initiatives. One could point to the BRICS working groups on drugs, counter-terrorism and ICT security to argue that progress has been made. But this would be missing the woods for the trees. Just look at India and China’s disagreements on terrorism and information and communications technologies and the differences among BRICS members become apparent. One could argue that this is just an issue between two members; but let’s not forget that these are the two biggest economies in the group.

In a sense, the biggest achievement of the BRICS over the past 15 years has been its ability to build and leverage its brand value as a club of emerging economies. This brand value derives more from the economic success of individual member states, particularly China and India, than the group’s collective bargaining power or clout. From my perspective, the current expansion of the BRICS grouping actually dilutes this brand value. It is unclear on what basis these new members were chosen and added. There were evidently no clear membership criteria – at least none were made public. The decisions on the new members simply appear to be products of political bargains. With this new constitution, can the BRICS now be termed as a group of emerging economies? Moreover, with new members like Iran and Saudi Arabia, there are likely to be new contradictions that the group will face, given that its decisions are made based on unanimous agreement.

On the question of who has gained from this expansion, I think the narrative that this is a victory for China is misplaced. For some time now, the BRICS grouping has been undergoing what I term as an identity crisis. This was sharply evident during the 2022 BRICS summit, which China hosted. If you read the speeches by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at that summit, it was clear that they wanted to group together to adopt a sharper geopolitical edge and broader security agenda. In contrast, the comments by the leaders of India, Brazil and South Africa suggested that the three countries largely wanted the BRICS to retain its development focus. So, does the expansion make it a much more geopolitically sound grouping that further Chinese and Russian interests? I am not sure that it does.

First, India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are close American partners. The US and Egypt too have a complex yet deep relationship. So, it is not like the new members are necessarily hostile to the US or the West. Of course, in a world where the distribution of power is undergoing rapid changes, they, like many others, are looking to expand their options and space for maneuverability. None of them, however, appreciate what they see as interference in domestic affairs, and all would like to hedge for better deals. Second, economics still remains the key driver for countries wanting to join BRICS. For Argentina, Egypt, Iran and the other new members, access to markets, shared concerns around food and energy security, access to new investments, dealing with the challenges presented by American sanctions, etc., remain important considerations. In other words, they are in there for their interests rather than to further Beijing’s geopolitical agenda. Where interests coincide, these countries will collaborate. That does not make the new BRICS an alternate bloc. In fact, I would wager that the expansion will make the BRICS much more unwieldy, and it is highly unlikely that we will see any institutionalization. Maintaining this informality suits the new members, as it does India.

What the US and its allies should, however, be concerned about are the grievances in large parts of the developing world over the lack of representation and regard for their interests, along with the erosion of trust in and the appeal of the rules-based order that the West claims to champion.

Q6. Looking at the bilateral India/China relationship, how do you see it improving and what do both sides need to do to get things back on track?

Unfortunately, I don’t see the India-China relationship improving in the near term. But there are, of course, steps that both governments can take to stem the deterioration and begin to build trust.

First, this process has to begin by restoring the pre-April 2020 status quo in Eastern Ladakh between the two forces, respecting the sanctity of agreements on conduct along the boundary and engaging in meaningful negotiations with regard to the dispute with practical steps being taken towards resolution.

Second, both sides need to restore dialogue at different levels. It is remarkable that there has been no formal meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese President since October 2019. The only two conversations since have been brief and described as informal. India and China are neighbors and rising powers. Deeper dialogue between the two sides is critical not just for their bilateral relationship but also for Asia and the world.

Third, both sides need to facilitate business and people to people exchanges. These exchanges will not be like they once were, i.e., fairly unencumbered by the weight of political differences. Nevertheless, they remain important.

Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, Beijing needs to begin viewing India as an independent actor, whose policies are driven by its strategic interests, rather than through the prism of the China-US competition. Doing so perhaps will allow it to appreciate the emergence of a multipolar Asia, with India being a key pole.

Q7. How does India view the US-led campaign to manage and “de-risk” the relationship with China? India will clearly follow its own self-interest, as it has done with its relationship with Russia, but where China is concerned, does India have a new set of push and pull factors that could bring it closer to the US? How can India benefit from increasing US/China tensions and what policies should it enact to realize these benefits?

As I have argued earlier, I think there is a recognition in Delhi that economic globalisation is undergoing fundamental changes. It’s not like global and regional supply chains are going to be nationalized. But it is clear that geopolitical concerns of states are going to continue to play a much larger role in economic decisions. This presents challenges for India, because it can lead to closing of markets and opportunities, along with the erection of new barriers impeding the free flow of capital and goods. Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the return to industrial policy across the West are cases in point.

On the flip side, this new form of segmented globalization, or globalization with politically determined yards and fences, can also create opportunities. For instance, if American, European and Japanese companies are looking to de-risk, India becomes an attractive option for them. This is particularly the case with regard to emerging technologies, clean energy, semiconductors, health, cybersecurity, etc. The Quad’s agenda in this regard is an example of the domains where geopolitics can lead to deeper economic cooperation.

In addition, starting from March 2020, the Indian government has initiated the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes across a range of sectors to boost domestic capacity. One of the aims of this policy is to attract foreign capital in Indian manufacturing. The most obvious impact of the PLI schemes has been in smartphone manufacturing, but as argued earlier, this too is dependent on Chinese components and investments to some degree.

Anyway, at the end of the day, if India needs to become an attractive destination for foreign investment, it needs to pursue further liberalization and factor market reforms. Geopolitical churn today has created favorable currents for India, it needs to now get the economics right too.

Q8. As someone with deep experience across India and China, how do you see the two cultures co-existing? Aside from political systems, are there any interesting cultural, literary, culinary or philosophical similarities that you find interesting? As someone who reads Chinese and appreciates idioms or 成語, are there concepts or ways of viewing the world that give you hope that India and China could find common ground or kinship one day?

Indeed, there are significant commonalities between India and China, and I don’t think that there is any deep socio-cultural friction. In fact, in terms of religion, traditions, customs and social life, there is a lot that binds the two people. Take the example of the significance of family as a social unit or the case of regard and reverence for ancestors, and you will see commonalities in customs. Likewise, in modern times, it is evident that these are both societies that have and are experiencing rapid urbanization and upward mobility for citizens, which engenders commonalities in experiences. Another commonality is the communitarian strand in both these societies when it comes to governance. To varying degrees, the community or the collective is socio-politically important in terms of governance approaches and philosophies in India and China. This is very distinct from the more individual-centered approach in the West.

Alas, where customs and people’s experiences may have commonalities, political cultures in India and China are very different, as are strategic interests.

Q9. Fear is a powerful motivator and is often at the core of disagreements and hostility. What are the primary fears India’s leaders and people have when they think about China? For example, is it fear of dependency? Invasion? Technological supremacy? Military superiority? Natural resource domination? From the Chinese side, do you think they share any similar fears when it comes to India?

I think fundamentally from an Indian perspective, the issue is not about fear. India is far too large a country, far too ancient a civilisation, far too significant an economy and far too capable militarily to suffer from existential anxieties or fear owing to the actions of external actors. Rather, the core issue in India-China ties is about trust. There is a deep sense of mistrust of Chinese intentions. From Delhi’s perspective, Beijing desires a unipolar Asia and is, therefore, inimical to its rise. Its actions are, thus, viewed from this perspective. Of course, the Chinese government and media have nurtured this narrative. The patronizing – and frankly at times racist – attitude of the Chinese media and establishment towards India, viewing it as an American lackey, deriding its autonomy, and disparaging its democracy, while emphasizing the power asymmetry that China enjoys, only breeds further mistrust. At the end of the day, Beijing needs to figure out means to build bridges and accommodate and appreciate diversity and multipolarity.

In contrast, from the PRC’s perspective, I do think that there is of course a lack of trust with India but also a sense of fear. In saying this, I draw a distinction between China, the ancient civilisation and large country with a rich history and tremendous capabilities, and the Communist Party of China. The Party-state system is a unitary system with the Communist Party politically in charge, and there is a sense that this system is facing an existential threat from the United States. In this context, when China views India predominantly through the prism of competition with America, the expansion of India’s power is seen as another arrow in the American quiver.

There is little that Delhi can, however, do to ease this anxiety of Beijing. I don’t quite know what it can tangibly offer. In fact, Delhi has been quite sensitive when it comes to Chinese core interests, whether it is with regard to developments in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan. This has been the case despite Beijing not reciprocating this sensitivity with regard to Indian concerns around Kashmir. Surely, to appease Beijing, Delhi cannot allow it a veto on India’s relationships with other states.

Q10. India has traditionally focused its defense agenda on the perceived threats from China and Pakistan, and repeatedly delayed the expansion of its naval capabilities. Is there a growing awareness of its weakness in the face of a well-equipped and rapidly growing Chinese navy increasingly active in the Indian Ocean? Would you agree that having a competitive advantage in the Indian Ocean, therefore, is a far more strategically significant threat to Indian power than the more heavily militarized and violence-prone Line of Actual Control (LAC)?

Over the past nearly 20 years, there has emerged a deeper appreciation within the Indian strategic affairs community about the significance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The Indian Navy’s response to the 2004 tsunami was an important moment, shaping the perception of and desire for India to emerge as a net security provider in the IOR. Over the years, there has been a marked shift in the conventional continentalist thinking in India. This change was captured well in Modi’s 2018 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Apart from outlining a uniquely Indian vision for the Indo-Pacific, he had sought to recast India’s strategic and historical identity as that of a maritime power, by referring to the significance of the oceans to pre-Vedic times, the Indus Valley civilization and even drawing from Indian mythology.

Importantly also, I think more than a threat, the view in India is that the maritime domain, particularly the IOR, presents a strategic opportunity. This is not simply in the context of the geographical advantage that India enjoys but also because it has far greater capacity, operational experience in the region and goodwill among IOR states than extra-regional actors like China. It is within this context that investments in naval capabilities are being done and drills with partners are being executed. Of course, there are bureaucratic and funding bottlenecks, but I think that there has been a significant mindset shift that has taken place, and this needs to be acknowledged.

With regard to China, it is indeed true that the PLA’s naval capabilities are expanding at a rapid pace, and its vessels are increasingly making their presence felt in the IOR. There is a PLA base in Djibouti, increasing cooperation with Pakistan, vessel sales to Bangladesh, a potential base in Gwadar, influence in the Maldives, and the periodic presence of Chinese submarines and docking of vessels in countries like Sri Lanka. That said, Beijing is a long way away from meaningfully projecting power in the IOR. Delhi understands this.

Q11. As a giant developing nation, how do you see climate change impacting India and is this an area where cooperation and alignment with China will eventually become a must-act situation? China is a world leader in EVs, batteries, solar, wind, hydro power, etc. Can India achieve its climate goals without China and if not, how might cooperation look between these countries?

On the issue of climate change, I think there are some convergences between India and China. This is particularly the case with regard to the broad set of challenges that climate change presents, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the need for the developed world to fulfill its financial obligations and support technology transfer to developing countries. In some instances, this has led to common diplomatic positions at multilateral forums. However, this trust too has diminished over the years. A catalyst for this was the Xi Jinping-Barack Obama deal in November 2014 in advance of the Paris Climate summit. It showed Delhi that Beijing, which was then part of the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries that were negotiating in a coordinated manner, was amenable to cutting its own deals with the developed world. Since then, it’s not like the two sides have not shared common positions, but policies have been driven by greater pragmatic self-interest.

On the issue of specific green technologies, this is not my particular area of study to be able to offer a nuanced, data-driven assessment. But what I can say is that China remains a critical actor in the supply chain for many key green technologies, and in a large number of product categories, trade with China does not generate strategic or critical vulnerabilities for India. I would, therefore, prefer that businesses be allowed to do what they do best, while the Indian government can work to incentivise domestic manufacturing. If Chinese investments enable this, then I don’t see the challenge with it.

On the other hand, when it comes to de-risking, it requires sector-by-sector and product-by-product decision-making; it has to be narrow in scope and balance strategic interests. This will result in difficult choices, but that’s what is required. And doing so is not simply about dependency on Chinese products but also about domestic competency and capacities, which will be needed as the world experiences greater segmentation in economic globalization. The declining imports of solar panel imports in India and enhanced domestic capacity is a case in point in this regard.

Q12. How do you view the “Global South” as a concept? Is it a meaningful construct that binds and aligns the interests of countries that fall within this group? Is it important that countries should push back on the US or Western-led dominance of world affairs? It evokes memories of the Non-Aligned Movement but these days, it seems increasingly like a China-dominated grouping that seeks to carve out a space independent of the US and its allies. Can India be a meaningful player in such a China-led initiative, or does it see things differently?

I think the term or concept of the Global South has significant narrative purchase, but I don’t see it as analytically useful. Let me explain the latter argument first. The Global South is supposed to encompass over 100 countries, with very different political systems, economic weights, histories, geographies and interests. There is little common that binds them, apart from perhaps the idea that there is a need for multilateralism and global governance to be more representative of their voices. The question then arises: who represents these voices? Can China or even India, as developing countries, truly represent the voices and concerns of say the Pacific Island Countries on the issue of climate change?

On the narrative front, however, there is significant activity that we are seeing. Both India and China are increasingly positioning themselves as leaders of the Global South. And there can be a tendency for people in the West to club them together. However, there are significant differences in the arguments that China and India are making, or the utility that such leadership implies for each. Delhi appears to view the Global South through the lens of shared grievances and interests and hopes to function as a bridge between the Global North and Global South. Its approach is not confrontational. I think the recent G20 summit was an example of this. Delhi positioned its presidency of the G20 as a means to amplify the voice and concerns of the Global South, while portraying itself as a leader. This serves Indian interests.

In contrast, Beijing’s outreach to the Global South appears to be driven by an agenda to tilt the scales in its favour in terms of its strategic competition with the US. A lot of Chinese messaging to the Global South revolves around building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind, which is essentially an alternative vision of the world order that Beijing is articulating. In dealing with the developing world, Chinese discourse tends to stress the need for development. But this is accompanied by the need for countries to pursue independent policies, reject “all forms of hegemony, power politics”, “the Western narrative of a rules-based international order”, and “bloc mentality”, while emphasizing a shared history of colonization.

It is important for Western states to appreciate these differences in the Indian and Chinese approaches, so as not to fall into the narrative trap of clubbing India and China in the same basket. It also allows the West to perhaps work with India and others to address the legitimate grievances, concerns and interests of countries in the Global South rather than further alienating them.

Q13. Please share any favorite books, blogs, podcasts or other resources that readers could use to improve their understanding of India, India/China relations or the BRICS.

Certainly. Let me begin by recommending Takshashila’s All Things Policy podcast. It is perhaps the world’s only daily public policy podcast. If you would prefer a deeper dive into understanding India, then I recommend Amit Verma’s podcast, The Seen and the Unseen. It is truly a remarkable product that provides an enriching and in-depth perspective on India.

In terms of India-China relations, I would like to recommend four books:

1. India, China, and the World: A Connected History by Tansen Sen

2. India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present by Shivshankar Menon

3. How China Sees India and the World by Shyam Saran

4. The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India by Vijay Gokhale

Of course, I also urge everyone to follow some of the remarkable and forward-looking work that my colleagues at Takshashila are engaged in, ranging from studying China and churn in the Indo-Pacific to technology geopolitics and bioethics and bio-governance.

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