The Philippines, China and the US Relationship: An interview with Julio S. Amador III

You may listen to this interview from HERE.

Julio S. Amador III is Interim President of the Foundation for the National Interest, Founder and Trustee of the non-profit FACTS Asia, and CEO of Amador Research Services. He regularly participates in Tracks 1.5 and 2 events and occasionally writes on national security and foreign affairs for various publications. Mr. Amador was a civil servant in the Philippine Government for more than a decade and worked on foreign affairs and national security issues. He was a Fulbright Graduate Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, an Asia Studies Visiting Fellow and EWC-Korea Foundation Visiting Scholar at the East-West Center in Washington DC, and a Senior Fellow of the Philippine Public Safety College. Mr. Amador has published peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and op-eds/commentaries in on-line news media. He has a chapter, co-authored with Deryk Baladjay titled “Course Correction from Over-Militarization: National Security from the Duterte to the Marcos Jr. Administrations” in the book, “Games, Changes and Fears: The Philippines from Duterte to Marcos” (ISEAS, forthcoming). He co-edited the book “A Handbook on Philippine Public Diplomacy” (DFA 2015) and co-authored the monograph “Reviewing Philippine-US Bilateral Defense Relations: The Legal, Military, and Diplomacy Perspectives” (NDCP, 2020). Mr. Amador continues to be deeply involved in designing executive education programs on foreign affairs and national security for defense, military, and private training and education institutions and serves as resource person on these issues.

Q1. Please introduce yourself and tell us about your current interests.

I call myself an observer of Philippine affairs particularly foreign policy, national security, and domestic politics. Working in the non-profit and private sector spaces has allowed me to get new perspectives, which can be quite different from my time in government service. I continue to be interested in US-Philippines security relations, China-Philippines ties, ASEAN and regional security. I convene discussion groups on these topics occasionally.

Q2. How would you characterize the current state of the Philippines/China relationship from an economic/trade, diplomatic and security perspective? Two incidents in October near Second Thomas Shoal have made headlines recently. Do you see these territorial disputes as having the potential to escalate or can these be isolated from the larger relationship?

Two things can be true at the same time. On the one hand, there is indeed a risk of escalation. Since taking Mischief Reef in 1995, China has steadily increased its activities. It has not been a good neighbor in the region, especially since the 2016 Arbitration Award. In the past few years alone, China has militarized its Coast Guard, extensively damaged the regional marine ecosystem, expanded and enforced its claims in the South China Sea, and, as you have mentioned, encroached on our sovereign territory in several harassment campaigns. The prevailing fear is that communication will break down and miscalculations will arise. This fear is primarily on China’s end. The Philippines has consistently utilized diplomacy and dialogue as instruments of confrontation.

On the other hand, both China and the Philippines have asserted that maritime confrontations do not represent the totality of our countries’ bilateral relations. Tangible evidence of this is the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism with Beijing, designed to be a direct line of communication on matters of concern. The Philippines welcomes Chinese tourists, Chinese technology imports, and accepts Chinese investments and partnerships for infrastructure projects, just to name a few. However, this compartmentalization is not absolute. Filipino favorability towards China is at an all-time low. China has rescinded cooperation on certain projects. The notion that security concerns can be separated from the larger bilateral relations is a double-edged sword because it affords both parties avenues to frankly discuss matters, however it leaves Manila at a disadvantageous position because substantive matters of concern are more often than not met without any credible solutions.

Q3. For those who are not familiar, please provide a bit of historical context of the Philippines relationship with China and how that has changed over the last ten years. Did the UNCLOS arbitration case in 2013 challenging the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim signify a significant change in the overall relationship?

There are two flashpoints that led to the arbitration case. The first is the 1995 Mischief Reef incident. This came about because the Philippines did not have the means of enforcing its sovereign rights and because the US had withdrawn from its bases. The second flashpoint is the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, which prompted a serious modernization project in the armed forces and the Aquino administration to file an arbitration case. This case was filed in 2013, much to China’s protest, and it was won in 2016, again much to China’s protest. On paper, this did not change the overall Philippines-China relations, given what I said earlier about compartmentalization. On the ground, however, China’s maritime aggression only increased, coupled with legal and cultural propaganda to either discredit the arbitration or to advance its territorial claims. Even when the Duterte administration attempted to downplay the arbitration to reap economic benefits, this did not change the situation on the ground. The so-called “balancing” of relations that the Marcos administration is doing has not changed China’s behavior either, but it has made our position stronger with the “renewal” in relations with the US.

To answer your question, a yes and a no. Despite two different approaches by two different administrations, China’s maritime activities have not stopped or slowed down. China was always planning to do all this, and they are just using the arbitration as an excuse whenever it comes up. The arbitration may have given China a sense of urgency, but they have made it clear what their intentions were from the start, and we are just now showing tangible results in pushing back. I would argue that the arbitration actually changed our relationship with the rest of the world. That is why China’s recent activities have received more criticism and condemnation from our allies, because there is now a foundation in international law.

Q4. The United States and the Philippines have a long and complicated history. Former President Duterte was seen as supportive of a foreign policy less dependent on the US and was inclined to look more favorably on China, especially in light of his “Build, Build, Build Program” that could potentially tap China’s BRI resources. Current President Marcos has embraced more US-friendly positions and has provided access to military bases. What spurred this change? Was it a result of the perceived threat from China or a return to a more typical status quo?

The view of China as a great power, especially compared to the Philippines, and that it would do anything to achieve its goals has persisted since 2012. On the surface there are two opposing schools of thought on dealing with China. On one side there is the view that we “appease” China, avoid confrontations as much as possible, and to maximize economic benefits. On the other side, there is the view that we should be proactive in strengthening alliances and partnerships, with the goal of countering China when necessary. The first school of thought mirrors the policies of the Obama administration when the US had to balance economic cooperation with China and the security concerns of the Philippines. Long story short, the US prioritized China to our expense. This fueled the Duterte administration’s shift away from the US and to accommodate China as much as possible. This is what caused the US to refocus its attention toward the alliance. The Trump and Biden administrations made efforts to renew America’s relationship with the Philippines.

Which leads us to where we are today: Both the Philippines and the US see the need for a strong relationship with each other, especially with common concerns surrounding China. That’s why we now see increased support from the US and increased cooperative measures with other partners including Vietnam, Australia, Japan, and to some extent South Korea. There is a great power rivalry between the US and China. It is in the US interest to be friendly with regional states, which includes us. For the Philippines, it is in our interest to cultivate and strengthen our relationship with the US to improve ourselves and to better assert our sovereignty.

Q5.  More broadly, how does the Philippines balance the competing interests of China and the United States in the years ahead? What is in the Philippines best interest and how does the country maintain geostrategic flexibility?

The Philippines is situated in a strategic location in the greatest geopolitical contest of our times between the US and China. Manila knows this. The challenge, really, is in ensuring we maximize our relationship with both countries without giving in to inciting escalations – despite China’s recent efforts. We do this by making sure state policies in dealing with China are well within the bounds of international law, and are consistent with our policy pronouncements in multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral fora.

In line with this the Philippines focuses on two things. The first is to keep the issue of US-China strategic competition within the platform of ASEAN. This is not a Philippines-only issue, but a Southeast Asian one, and much more so an Indo-Pacific one. The second is the assurance that the Philippines will always operate within international law. That means we will not be the first to fire a shot nor will we be aggressive or provocative, no matter what China says.

Q6. What has been your experience with people to people relations between China and the Philippines in recent years? How do Filipinos view China today? Several of the richest and most powerful families in the Philippines are ethnic Chinese. Do they play a role as connectors between the two societies/economies? On the Chinese side, how do you think the Chinese people perceive the Philippines? 

The Filipinos and the Chinese have a very strong cultural history. With that in mind, much of the communities with Chinese lineage are now established Filipinos. There is no question of their loyalties. However, we must raise the point that there is a delineation between established Filipino-Chinese communities and those Chinese that came from mainland China. True enough, Filipino-Chinese businessmen are advantageous linkages that help bridge the Chinese and Filipino market. However, they do not play a substantive role in bridging security dialogues between the Philippines and China.

Regarding how we view each other, it is not favorable. China has been unpopular since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident and recent events have only worsened this view. Everyday Filipinos, that is, Filipinos who are not within the security sector, are well aware of or are victims of Chinese offshore gambling, misbehaving Chinese tourists, scams from Chinese-operated businesses, election-related interference from Chinese troll farms, and trafficking. My team at Amador Research Services conducted a survey last year on the popularity of China, among others, gauging the Filipino security sectors’ sentiments toward Beijing. We found two important insights: China is both the least favorite in terms of choice of security partners, and the top choice of a country that the Philippines should not associate with. This is a telling picture of how unpopular China is right now on the ground, and it’s not surprising that recent transparency efforts supplement the data that our team naturally gathered on the ground. With regards to the Chinese view of Filipinos, I can only speculate because of how tightly controlled information is in the mainland. I know that the Arbitration is not commonly understood and that any information they receive about Filipinos, and the wider world really, are from state-sanctioned sources.

Q7. What is the current state of the Philippines relationship with ASEAN and how would you characterize that dynamic? Do you see ASEAN becoming a more effective body, if not on major geopolitical issues, than at least as a forum to address regional concerns? The various ASEAN states have differing views on China and the US, and how they wish to align themselves. Do you see this as a weakness or a potential strength as ASEAN seeks to navigate the US/China geopolitical struggle in the years ahead?

The Philippines sees ASEAN as a platform where states can come together and cooperate on regional issues for the collective and individual benefit of its members. The Philippines is a strong supporter of ASEAN Centrality, that is to say member-states come together and agree as a whole on a course of action. This dynamic has been essential in dealing with external actors such as the US and China. ASEAN has offered to be a mediator or a third-party platform for various conflicts and crises outside of its regional purview. That said, you are correct that there is a rift among the members regarding China and the US. The land neighbor members (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia) are more inclined to be non-confrontational with China due to its control of the Mekong River, which is a prime source of livelihood for these countries. On the other hand, the maritime members (Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Timor Leste, and the Philippines) are more confrontational because China is more proactive in its activities.

Views across Southeast Asia generally see ASEAN as a useful mechanism for dialogue on many issues. You will note that ASEAN has been consistent in its desire for a Code of Conduct with China. ASEAN can come to agreements, but the strength or weakness of these agreements are dependent on individual circumstances. Politically, it is difficult to attest to the efficacy of ASEAN. Challenges still abound for ASEAN on important geopolitical security matters such as the China question, the Ukraine-Russia border dispute, the Myanmar crisis, and even the recent Israel-Hamas altercations. But on economic, environmental, social, and cultural aspects, the international community can be assured that ASEAN is a steadfast player.

Q8. As a demographically young country with strong growth potential, how does the economy move up the value chain and avoid the middle income trap? To achieve this, which are the most important countries to the Philippines and how will these economic/trade relationships of the future influence the country’s foreign relations and security concerns?

The Philippines does indeed pose economic promise in the region and the present administration is working to cultivate this. The Philippine government is optimistic about the transition to a high-income economy in the next few decades. As we speak, there are efforts to move towards the digital such as basic government services, taking reference from the digital market boom at the height of the pandemic. There is also an effort to equip the younger generations with more relevant skills and an effort to bring back talent in the Philippines to heighten and increase competitiveness in the long term. There is the lingering challenge of ease of doing business in the Philippines, but there are no present efforts or policy pronouncements to augment particular legislations on this front.

The Philippines still eyes China as an economic partner and continues to trade with Beijing in the belief that it is still a beneficial country to deal with, even as we keep security issues in mind. Emerging markets include the broader Indo-Pacific region, including Australia, Japan, and South Korea (with which an FTA was recently concluded). The Philippines also eyes deeper economic ties with the European Union and are formalizing an FTA with the body. At present, Manila enjoys preferential trading status with the EU under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP+). And, of course, with the US.

Q9. While conflict is never a welcome development, how is the Philippines military preparing for the potential of kinetic warfare in defense of its territorial claims? As a mostly American-trained armed forces, how does the military influence policymaking with countries like China or the US?

I will answer your second question first. For the longest time, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been oriented to train for and respond to internal security issues. This has come at the expense of growing external security concerns. Right now, there is a slow but noticeable shift for the AFP to focus on external security. This is reflected in the Modernization Program. While I cannot speak on behalf of the AFP, I know that it is actively engaging the public on important discussions. The AFP is present in all discussions that involve China, alliance management issues, other partner-countries and so on. I am certain that they are conducting war simulations within closed doors on important regional flashpoints.

That said, the Philippine policy remains focused on defense, dialogue, and diplomacy. We have renounced war in our constitution. The Philippines is focused on (1) preventing any changes to the status quo by opposing China through strategic transparency, (2) bolster Philippine capabilities through the Modernization Program and increased maritime domain awareness, (3) cultivate and strengthen alliances and partnerships, and to (4) challenge China whenever necessary without using military assets and relying on our Coast Guard to do its job.

Q10. There is much discussion of the Global South and the expanding BRICS community. As a developing nation with a history of colonialism, how does the Philippines view these new groupings? Chinese commentators see the Philippines reluctance to join BRICS and its late ratification of RCEP as examples of it being beholden to the US. Do you think that is a fair assessment?

No, it is not a fair assessment. The Philippines welcomes these groupings and states are well within their sovereign rights to join or not to join based on their interests. China’s provocative approach in viewing the Philippines as reluctant to forego its colonial mentality is disrespectful of the latter’s sovereignty and takes away agency from Filipino policymakers. The world does not revolve around China’s narrative of colonialism. We live in an unprecedented era of cooperation, cordiality, and diplomacy. China only undermines itself and its relations by suggesting otherwise and insinuating states like the Philippines are still colonies. If China hopes to be a credible global superpower, it must show this in its actions. Unfortunately, they failed time and time again, gaslighting even the Philippines as “provocative”.

As for the Philippines in general, it would be more apt to say that the Philippines chooses to align itself strategically with counterparts it deems it shares its values with. If national consciousness in the Philippines points to China as a threat, then policymakers will ultimately align with countries who think the same way. The burden is on China to reshape and clean its image.

Q11. The Philippines is often cited as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. Rapid sea level rise, variability/intensity of rainfall, and the devastating impact of tropical cyclones are just some of the issues threatening the country. What is the country’s plan to address climate change, and will there be a role for China, as it is a world leader in many critical green technologies?

To again answer your second question first: Internationally, yes. That is among the many reasons why the Philippines remains cordial with China. There is a shared understanding between Manila and other countries in the region that China plays a role in addressing climate change. Even the Americans know this. But China tends to conflate different issues with its political agenda, making something as complicated as climate resilience more complicated by, for example, involving the question of Taiwan’s independence.

As for the Philippines, the government recognizes that it is especially vulnerable to natural disasters and the like. Our marine resources are poorly managed and seldom defended from illegal activities. The Philippines desires to work with the international community to alleviate these problems, and that includes China.

Q12. You are personally involved in Track 1.5 and 2 diplomatic efforts. For those who are not familiar with these terms, please describe what they mean. What is the role for such interactions, and do you see them as critical for ensuring healthy relations between states, especially when there are points of friction or conflict?

There are two important diplomatic tracks at play. Track 1 is the official track where governments/states officially discuss and negotiate international affairs, primarily through foreign ministries. Track 2 efforts at diplomacy involve think-tanks and non-government experts from universities and non-profits and even business, to think and talk through international problems and provide an alternative avenue to bring messages or provide ideas to Track 1. Track 1.5 is where both tracks can meet without any official hats on and have a robust dialogue.

Track 1.5 and Track 2 are critical paths for dialogue, in my view. I have seen them to be useful conduits to provide ideas in otherwise intractable negotiations. It is essential to maintain a good network of contacts, provide good analysis and research, and maintain discretion when doing Track 1.5 and Track 2 work.

Q13. Please share any favorite books, blogs, podcasts or other resources that readers could use to improve their understanding of the Philippines or its relations with China, ASEAN and the United States.

Some books and essays which I suggest should be part of the reading list of anyone interested in Indo-Pacific affairs:

1. Asian Studies 57:1 (2021) – A set of sober analysis of PH-China relations from the preeminent China expert, the late Dr. Aileen Baviera. The publication also hosts a wide variety of tributary essays on the expertise and person of Dr. Baviera.

2. Pacific Forum’s Issues & Insights Volume 22 SR1 (2021) – A set of thought pieces on US-PH relations from emerging experts from the US and the PH.

3. Working Together To Secure Our Sea (2021) – a primer on the PH’s maritime zones by maritime expert and former PH Permanent Representative to IMO Mr. Gilberto Asuque

4. Modernizing or equalizing? (2022) – a co-authored journal article published in Defence Studies where I explore the status of the Philippines’ modernization thrust. A free version of the article’s predecessor is available in SSRN.

5. National Security Survey – My research firm’s own national security survey, conducted annually.

6. I also welcome everyone to visit, read, and contribute to https://www.factsasia.org/.
 

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